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L’éducation et la formation constituent des enjeux fondamentaux pour la société contemporaine.  Deux équipes 
de recherche à l’UCL se préoccupent de ces questions : le GIRSEF et la CPU. 
 
Le GIRSEF est un groupe de recherche pluridisciplinaire fondé en 1998 afin d'étudier les sytèmes d’éducation 
et de formation.  L’attention est portée notamment sur l’évaluation de leurs résultats en termes d’équité et d’effi-
cacité, sur leurs modes de fonctionnement et de régulation, sur les politiques publiques à leur endroit, les 
logiques des acteurs principaux ou encore sur le fonctionnement local des organisations de formation ou l’en-
gagement et la motivation des apprenants.  Sur le plan empirique, ses recherches portent essentiellement sur 
le niveau primaire et secondaire d’enseignement, mais aussi sur l’enseignement supérieur et la formation 
d’adultes. 
 
La Chaire de Pédagogie Universitaire (CPU) a été créée en mai 2001 et a reçu le label de Chaire UNESCO sur 
l’Enseignement Supérieur en septembre 2002.  Elle assure également le secrétariat et la coordination du 
réseau européen des chaires Unesco sur l’Enseignement supérieur.  Elle a pour mission de contribuer à la pro-
motion de la qualité de la pédagogie universitaire à l’UCL, par le biais de la recherche dans le domaine et de 
l’enseignement (DES en pédagogie universitaire). 
 
La série des Cahiers de recherche en Education et Formation était précédemment publiée sous le nom de 
« Cahiers de recherche du GIRSEF ».  Cette série a pour objectif de diffuser les résultats des travaux menés 
au sein de la CPU et du GIRSEF auprès d’un public de chercheurs en sciences de l’éducation et de la forma-
tion ainsi qu’auprès des acteurs et décideurs de ces deux mondes. 
 
L’ensemble de la série est téléchargeable gratuitement depuis les sites du GIRSEF(www.girsef.ucl.ac.be), de la 
CPU (www.cpu.psp.ucl.ac)  ainsi qu' I6DOC (www.i6doc.com).
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What is justice in education? How can we evaluate 
whether given distributions of educational inputs or 
educational outcomes are just or not? How should a 
society distribute its educational resources? How can 
we evaluate the level of (un)fairness of a schooling 
system? In this paper, we try to provide a basic 
framework for thinking about these normative ques-
tions in what we consider to be a rigorous way. In 
order to accomplish such task, we interrelate differ-
ent strands of literature, namely: theories of distribu-
tive justice, developed by political philosophers, con-
cepts and tools used in microeconomics (especially in 
welfare economics), and insights from positive eco-
nomics of education. We present, illustrate, and criti-
cize what ‘justice in education’ is, according to four 
normative positions – utilitarianism, libertarianism, 
egalitarianism and egalitarian liberalism. 
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What is justice in education? How can we evaluate 
whether given distributions of educational inputs or 
educational outcomes are just or not? How should a 
society distribute its educational resources? How can 
we evaluate the level of (un)fairness of a schooling 
system? 
In this paper, we try to provide a basic framework for 
thinking about such normative questions in what we 
consider to be a rigorous and systematic way. In or-
der to accomplish such task, we interrelate different 
strands of literature, namely: theories of distributive 
justice, developed by political philosophers, concepts 
and tools used in microeconomics (especially in wel-
fare economics), and insights from positive econom-
ics of education. Some simple graphics and mathe-
matics are used in order to present some points in a 
clearer manner or to illustrate some points that are 
made or examples that are shown. The reader who 
does not feel comfortable with them can skip them 
without compromising the understanding of the con-
tent of the text.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 distin-
guishes positive and normative approaches in eco-
nomics of education, and presents the welfare eco-
nomics tools that are used throughout the paper. In 
sections 3 to 6, we discuss what an equitable educa-
tional system amounts to, according to four main sets 
of contemporary theories of social justice – utilitarian-
ism (section 3), libertarianism (sec. 4), egalitarianism 
(sec. 5) and egalitarian liberalism (sec. 6). Section 7 
summarizes the ideas presented at previous sections 
through a simple example, as well as through a brief 
discussion about intermediary cases. In section 8, we 
point out the main virtues and limitations of this work. 
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Many economists take it for granted that the social 
objective of an educational system is that of maxi-
mizing its efficiency, frequently understood as maxi-
mizing the aggregate performance of students. By 
choosing this objective, the economist would not be 
required to do any particular – contestable and possi-
bly embarrassing – normative choice and could com-
fortably keep on working within positive economics. 
Nevertheless, the apparent neutrality or impartiality 
of this procedure hides, in fact, some particular nor-
mative assumptions. In a certain sense, aiming at the 
maximization of aggregate performance reflects a 
particular kind of utilitarian view of the educational 
system (educationist utilitarian, as it will be shown 
later). In its simplest version, educationist utilitarian-
ism does not attach any importance at all to the dis-
tribution of education, caring only about the sum total 
of educational output.   
Not only in education, but also in various other set-
tings, many economists explicitly or implicitly adopt a 
utilitarian normative position. Indeed, for Sen (2000), 
“in many respects, utilitarianism serves as the 
“default program” in welfare-economic analysis”. One 
of the reasons for this could be that, for many years, 
normative investigation was not the field that had im-
proved more noticeably within economics 
(Arnsperger & Van Parijs, 2000). Another possible 
reason is that the economic science has been nur-
tured in a utilitarian normative framework for years 
making it difficult to incorporate and develop analy-
ses based on other normative standpoints. Whatever 
the reason, the fact is that for long time utilitarianism, 
and the related Pareto-optimality principle, were the 
normative criteria more frequently taken into account 
in economic analysis.  
Nevertheless, many social scientists (including 
economists) insist on the fact that an important social 
objective of an educational system is to achieve eq-
uity. There is no agreement, neither on what an equi-
table educational system is, nor on what kinds of ine-
qualities should be considered inequitable or unfair 
(of access?, of treatment?, of opportunities?, of out-
comes?, …). Despite these differences, egalitarian 
observers agree that priority must be turned to equal-
ity issues, and not solely to efficiency. 
In more general terms, however, utilitarian and egali-
tarian views of justice represent only two particular 
and somewhat extreme normative viewpoints, which, 
alongside libertarianism and egalitarian liberalism, are 
classified by Arnsperger & Van Parijs (2000) as the 
four main approaches in contemporary theories of so-
cial justice. Each of these four grand theories provide 
very different interpretations of what justice stands for. 
In education, each of these theories would provide 
completely different answers to the questions stated in 
the introduction of this paper. 
But how exactly can a normative economics of educa-
tion analysis be done? A promising strategy seems to 
consist of translating, as rigorously as possible, the 
main philosophical theories of justice into normative 
criteria and objectives in the particular field of educa-
tion. These criteria and objectives should be as con-
crete, measurable and comparable as possible, re-
specting pre-defined mathematical properties. This 
methodological strategy is indeed recommended by a 
prominent normative economist in a paper about a 
similar topic (Kolm, 2002, on the relationship between 
health and justice), and justified in terms of recent 
“important advances in the systematization of the 
analysis of justice on the one hand”, and “in the rather 
technical sub-field of the measures of unjust inequali-
ties on the other hand”. In this paper, we explore 
some aspects related essentially to the first issue 
raised by Kolm, that is, the systematization of the 
analysis of justice. 
However, such normative analysis should not ignore 
the knowledge accumulated by positive economics of 
education, especially the extensive available literature 
on educational production functions. Recent works 
have emphasized the importance of taking into ac-
count factors such as the educational institutional set-
ting (Vandenberghe, 1996), principal-agent networks 
(Woessman, 2000), non-monetary inputs such as per-
sonal effort, peer effects and other kinds of social in-
teractions (Vandenberghe, 1999; Trannoy, 1999; Ak-
erlof & Kranton, 2000), among many other essential 
ingredients to the production of education. 

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2.1. Positive economics of education : education 
production functions 
So before proceeding to the normative analysis, it is 
worthwhile to take a quick look at what positive eco-
nomics of education – essentially education produc-
tion function – is worried about.  
Education production functions literature treats enti-
ties of the schooling system – schools, universities, 
and the whole schooling system – as firms that allo-
cate a vector of inputs (call it Z) in order to achieve 
some outcome (call it A). Investigating the relation-
ship between inputs and outputs would eventually 
allow us to identify the available technology for pro-
ducing educational outcomes. Knowing this technol-
ogy would then allow us to design policies which, by 
making an appropriate mix of inputs, would improve 
the level (or the quality) of the output, according to 
previously defined normative objectives. 
There is no consensus about the most correct speci-
fication of an education production function but many 
studies take into account about the same sets of in-
puts as components of the vector Z. In fact, an ideal 
or complete production function may never be esti-
mated in any empirical study due to the lack of data. 
But in an abstract level this ‘complete production 
function’ can be stated and take the following form: 
 
@E5@
 (02F$650:	(6
(
(Ai) represents the achievement of a pupil i in the 
present time. Typically it can represent an individ-
ual’s score in a centralized national exam, or the at-
tainment of a particular educational level (e.g.: finish-
ing secondary school), the total years of schooling 
etc.. It is a function of: 
(Ai-1): previous achievement; 
(Ti): innate talent or ability; 
(Ei): effort, which is a function of motivation, person-
ality, talent etc.; 
(Si): a vector of school resources such as teacher’s 
wages, quality of infra-structure, per-pupil expenditure, 
class size, teacher’s and principal’s education and ex-
perience, and so on; 
(Ii): institutional and organizational features, such as 
the source of funding (private versus public), kind of 
hiring procedure (decentralized versus centralized), 
whether central cognitive exams for the assessment of 
students are employed or not etc.. 
(Ni): a vector of non-monetary resources such as char-
acteristics of peers (average E, T, P etc.) and the so-
called social capital (characteristics of community and 
family); 
As an illustration, consider that the achievement vari-
able, Ai, represents the score each student attains in 
an international assessment examination such as 
OECD’s PISA 2000, for example, in mathematics. 
Suppose pupil j achieves a high score (say, 600), 
while pupils k has a low score (say, 400). Knowing 
that each pupil had at her disposal different mixes of 
the inputs listed above, positive economists of educa-
tion would try to find out, among other things, what is 
the contribution of each input to explain the scores of 
the students, and what are the possible trade-offs be-
tween the inputs to achieve a given score level. As a 
consequence, at least indirectly, they will also be able 
to find out the reasons underlying the score gap be-
tween the two individuals – for example, does the 
gaps exist primarily due to a different amount of trans-
ferable inputs, such as school resources, S, or is it 
largely due to nontransferable inputs, such as the 
amounts of talent, T? 
The bottom line is that these analyses of educational 
production functions should eventually reveal the 
‘technology’ for producing education, with visible pol-
icy implications. 
 
2.2. Normative economics of education : how to 
distribute resources? 
Knowing the technology of education by means of 
educational production function is certainly a relevant 
matter. But even if the technology for producing edu-
cation was a settled issue – which is not, since there 
are many open questions in that field –, the normative 
questions of the introduction would still not have been 
answered. 
In education it is particularly problematic to tear apart 
production from distribution decisions, that is, it is 
(
	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
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more difficult than in others sectors to clearly distin-
guish positive and normative concerns. Partly this 
derives from the fact that it is impossible to redistrib-
ute educational outcomes once a person has ac-
quired it. If some redistribution is to be accomplished, 
it has to take place during the very moment of its pro-
duction, that is, during schooling years - by contrast 
with monetary income, which can be taxed and 
transferred at any point of individuals’ lifetime. An-
other reason is that it is impossible to redistribute 
some of the relevant inputs, such as talents, ability or 
family environment, since they are obviously not 
transferable from one person to another – again, in a 
clear contrast with respect to monetary income. Fi-
nally, a policy may be feasible but perhaps too inva-
sive if it aims at influencing some family or commu-
nity practices, in order for them to become ‘good in-
puts’ in the education process (that is, trying to shift 
Ni up in equation 1). Thus policies whose objective is 
to (re)distribute educational inputs are limited to act-
ing only on some inputs and possibly on those that 
are not the most crucial ones. 
Therefore a given society cannot simply produce the 
total amount of education and then redistribute a 
fraction of it to each person, in line with some norma-
tive prescription. The form of the ex post distribution 
of educational outcome requires an ex ante norma-
tive decision concerning which is the desirable final 
distribution. 
Thus in order to decide how society should (re)
distribute educational inputs it is important to define 
which are the desirable socio-economic criteria and 
objectives. The primary source for these criteria and 
objectives are moral values in general, and systema-
tizations of them made by theories of distributive jus-
tice in particular. These criteria and objectives are 
the basis on which one can judge whether a society 
or a particular instance of socio-economic life is just 
or not or to rank different situations and assess how 
just they are according to some benchmark or as 
compared to other societies. In our case, the desir-
able or optimal socio-economic objective we want to 
define is the social objective of a schooling system. It 
is equivalent to determining what is the optimal (or 
desirable or fair) way in which one can aggregate Ai 
over a series of individuals (that is, when j =1,…,n).2  
In sections 3 to 6, we expose our interpretation of 
what four main sets of theories of social justice have 
to say about justice in education. We don’t have the 
ambition to scrutinize them deeply.3 Instead, we intend 
to present only their crucial points and to discuss in 
what sense they can be related to education. Before 
turning to them, we introduce some useful welfare 
economics tools. 
 
2.3. Welfare economics 
When presenting each normative position in sections 
3-6 we make use of some straightforward graphic rep-
resentations often employed in microeconomics, and 
particularly in welfare economics. For non-economists 
to understand these graphics, some brief explanations 
are necessary. 
We will be working in a two-dimensional setting. The 
y-axis represents j, which can be a particular individ-
ual, or a demographic group (such as, for instance, a 
majority race group in a given population). The x-axis 
represents k, another individual or group (say, a mi-
nority race group). 
The attributes measured in both axes are sometimes 
the level of utility, Ui, and sometimes the level of edu-
cational achievements, Ai. Utility is a subjective meas-
ure which represents the well-being of individuals, or 
equivalently, their welfare (that is why the term 
“welfare economics” is used). An individual i is said to 
have a higher level of utility in situation A as compared 
to situation B if his personal preferences (which are 
subjective) are satisfied to a greater extent under A 
than under B. This individual i is said to have a higher 
level of utility than individual g when both are under 
situation C if the preferences of the former are satis-
fied to a greater extent than those of the latter. In wel-
farist approaches the relevant attribute is the level of 
satisfaction of preferences of individuals, that is, their 
welfare or utility levels. Within this framework, different 
individuals can reach the same level of welfare while 
having different levels of educational achievements. 
For example, it is not excluded the possibility that a 
highly educated person and a poorly educated person 
be equally satisfied in their lives, that is, that they 
reach the same level of utility or welfare. 
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The level of utility of an individual, Ui, is a function of 
his achievement level, Ai, but also of a vector of 
other relevant variables, Xi. A variable representing 
the health status of an individual could arguably be 
one component of this vector Xi – a highly educated 
individual possibly cannot transform his education 
achievement into utility if his health condition is too 
poor. The reasoning applies to a series of other pos-
sible components of Xi. 
Achievement, Ai, on the contrary, is an objective at-
tribute. In what we will call educationist approaches, 
the center of attention is set to be the educational 
achievement itself, regardless of the impact that edu-
cational achievement might have on welfare (that is, 
on utility or preference satisfaction). Two individuals 
with the same level of educational achievement (say, 
both holding a degree from the same university) could 
have different levels of welfare, but that aspect would 
be overlooked by educationists. 
As it will become clear throughout the text, education-
ists are concerned with a mesojustice issue – they 
care about justice in education, despite the conse-
quences education might have on other relevant vari-
ables. Welfarists, on the other hand, are worried about 
a macrojustice issue – they care about justice as a 
whole, and education is only one component of it. 
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The feasible levels of utility, are represented in the 
graphs by a set of points (such as A to F in graph 1), 
which is called the possibility set. The highest feasi-
ble levels under the available technology (such as C 
and D) define a frontier. It is technically impossible to 
reach a point which is located at the north-east of 
such frontier (such as X). If we are on the frontier the 
utility of one individual can be improved only by sac-
rificing a fraction of the utility of the other. In technical 
terms, we assume that the utility possibility set gener-
ates a frontier which is: (i) continuous, (ii) concave to 
the origin, and (iii) monotonically decreasing from left 
to right.4 
Positive economics of education can inform us on how 
to move from an interior point in the possibility set to a 
,	
	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
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frontier point over this set (for example, from A to C 
or from A to D in graph 1).5 Suppose evidences from 
education production function studies show that 
teacher’s wages have a stronger impact on students’ 
performance than the number of computers per pu-
pil. A policy that reduced the fraction of the educa-
tional budget which is allocated to the acquisition 
computers and increased its fraction allocated to 
paying teachers’ wages could, in principle, lead this 
schooling system from a point closer to the origin 
(say, A) to a point closer to the possibility frontier 
(say, B).  
The impact of such a policy may not be neutral 
across individuals, but instead it might be such that 
one individual (say, k) benefits more from that policy 
than another individual (say, j). If such a non-neutral-
across-pupils policy was implemented, society could 
move from point E to F (exclusively to the benefit of 
individual k). 
Each normative position will be represented in the 
graphs by a different shape of social welfare functions 
(SWF). SWF can be seen as a representation of 
‘social preferences’. All the points of a higher SWF 
(such as S3) are preferred to any point of S1 (X is pre-
ferred to B or to E). All the points over a particular 
SWF (such as S1 in graph 1) are equally desirable 
(such as B and E). The expression ‘equally desirable’ 
is used here as a synonymous with ‘equally fair’ or 
‘both optimal’.  
A point located at the highest SWF (that is, the one 
which is more to the northeast) that is feasible under 
the currently available technology gives us an optimal 
allocation according to a given theory of justice (for 
example, point D in graph 1). 
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Utilitarians believe that a just society is a happy soci-
ety. The objective at which society should aim is to 
maximize its sum total (or average, according to al-
ternative formulations) of happiness, or equivalently, 
of “utility”.6 2

	= 	 	 

the happiness, or the utility, of individual A by x units, 
it increases the utility of individual B by y units. Sup-
pose also that it has no effects whatsoever on the 
utility levels of other individuals. If y is greater than x, 
a utilitarian would be in favor of that policy, since it 
would increase aggregate (and average) utility of so-
ciety. Accordingly, if y is smaller than x, a coherent 
utilitarian would be against that policy. 
According to a pure utilitarian approach (welfarist 
utilitarianism), the objective of the schooling system 
is to maximize the total utility. With regards to educa-
tion, the utilitarian position does not necessarily re-
quire the maximization of the total level of education, 
but rather the maximization of the total utility derived 
from education. A very simple mathematical formula-
tion of the welfarist utilitarian maximand is as follows: 
 
W =  Ui (Ai ,Xi)     
(Equation 2 : Welfarist utilitarianism) 
 
where: i = 1,…n. The normative objective in terms of 
social welfare (W) is defined as the sum of utilities (Ui) 
that each individual derives from his or her educa-
tional achievements (Ai) and of other relevant vari-
ables (Xi). 
 
In a society of two individuals, k and j (or two groups 
of individuals, say autochthones and foreign-born), the 
welfarist utilitarian position can be expressed graphi-
cally in figure 2.  
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In graph 1 of figure 2, we assume a symmetric possi-
bility set, meaning that the two individuals (or groups 
of individuals) have been endowed with a similar ca-
pacity for producing utility. The optimal allocation ac-
cording to a utilitarian would then be the point W1, in 
which both individuals would have the same amount 
of utility (Uk1 = Uj1). In graph 2 of figure 2, the possi-
bility set is asymmetric, that is, we assume that indi-
vidual j is capable of producing more utility than indi-
vidual k out of a given amount of educational 
achievements. The optimal point, W2, is not anymore 
over the 45° line, that is, the optimal outcomes for 
each of the individuals are different (Uk2 < Uj2). 
Standard welfare economics frequently takes income 
(or consumption) as the relevant component of the 
utility function of each individual. Empirical evidences 
show that education is an important determinant of 
future productivity and future earning capacity of an 
individual. Combining the latter fact and the former 
assumption one could conclude that what really mat-
ters for determining the future amount of utility of an 
individual are her educational achievements. Sche-
matically, we would have: Educational achievements 
determine wages, which in turn, determine the utility 
level. In such a setting, utilitarians could conclude that 
the objective of the schooling system is that of maxi-
mizing post-schooling outcomes (especially aggregate 
wages). 
Utilitarian educational policies would then care about 
enhancing the future earning capacity of pupils, with-
out particular concerns regarding any skills which 
would be deprived of future market value. In this crude 
version of utilitarianism, there would be no reason 
whatsoever to care about the distribution of educa-
tional outcomes. Policies would probably be set to 
‘pick the winners’, that is, to select the most efficient 
utility-producers-out-of-education (such as individual j 
in graph 2 of figure 2) and invest in them a great 
amount of the available educational resources. 
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Where: O: origin; FF’: utility possibility frontier; Wn : optimal allocation; Sn: social welfare contours S3  S2  
S1; Ui: utility of individual i; Ai: educational achievement of individual I ; Xi: vector of other variables influencing 
utility of individual i. 
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Measurement problems and interpersonal 
comparability of utilities 
A utilitarian would support a particular policy if it im-
plied an increased total, or average, utility. It is, how-
ever, impossible to compute all gains and losses de-
rived from the implementation of such a policy. Take 
the example of the implementation of a positive dis-
crimination policy, which would allocate a certain pro-
portion of available places at good schools to indi-
viduals belonging to a given minority group. An indi-
vidual who benefits from such a policy is certainly 
better off in terms of present benefits, since she has 
the possibility of consuming a scarce good – study-
ing at a good school – which would not have been 
available to her without the policy. And she is proba-
bly also better off in terms of future benefits: she will 
enhance her probability of reaching higher steps in 
the schooling system and, eventually, of having a 
good social position in the future (higher wages, 
higher utility level).  
Nonetheless, the same individual could well have 
losses due to that policy. For example, if the positive 
discrimination policy were very widespread and am-
bitious, it could be the case that the average quality 
of students fell drastically in some of the ‘good 
schools’. If this is so, not only the aggregate previous 
achievement (Ai-1), but also the aggregate quality of 
the peers (a component of Ni), and possibly other 
inputs, would be lower, leading to a lower aggregate 
achievement (lower Ai). Under reasonable assump-
tions, Ai being lower, Ui would also be lower. De-
veloping the utilitarian reasoning, one could claim 
that such an ambitious positive discrimination policy 
would have a negative effect on the quality of the 
best students, reducing future aggregate wages and 
aggregate utility level in that community. Thus, even 
the individual that benefited from that policy could 
possibly lose utility.7 
Clearly, it is difficult to assess whether a particular 
policy would bring more benefits than costs even to 
an individual. Moreover, if we take into account that at 
least one other individual would lose his place at the 
good school, the difficulties involved in actually com-
puting gains and losses, both in the present and in the 
future, become enormous.  
The example we used reveals another problem of the 
utilitarian approach, both on the theoretical and on the 
empirical level: the fact that it requires interpersonal 
comparison of utilities. The difficulties regarding such 
a requirement have probably been the most frequent 
criticism on utilitarianism. What metric should we use 
to measure x and y in the above example? How could 
one compare the increase of happiness or utility in-
curred by individual A, who received the right to get 
into the good school, with the level or decrease in-
curred by individual B, who has just lost the same 
right? Should we assume that their utility functions are 
the same? Isn’t it arbitrary an assumption, given that 
people have so different preferences? 
 
Ordinal approach, Pareto-optimality and 
unanimity 
The traditional solution adopted by economics to deal 
with the problem of interpersonal comparison of utili-
ties has been, for a long time, to simply put it aside. 
This has been done through the use of a normative 
criterion that dispenses with interpersonal comparison 
of utilities – the so-called Pareto optimality. This crite-
rion requires that each individual ranks different allo-
cations according to the utility he obtains from each of 
them. By relying on ordinal utility, this criterion does 
not demand any kind of comparison of utilities be-
tween different individuals. At the aggregate level, an 
allocation A is known to be Pareto-preferred to an allo-
cation B if all individuals either prefer A to B, or are 
indifferent between A and B. Thus, an allocation which 
cannot be replaced by any other without harming at 
least one individual is said to be Pareto-optimal.  
B"=				 	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
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In figure 3, we assume a symmetric possibility set. 
We assume that in the first moment, the actual allo-
cation is Z0. An educational policy will only we ap-
proved of by the Pareto criterion if it does not harm 
any of the two individuals (or group of individuals), 
that is, if it does not reduces the utility neither of j, 
nor of k. So, given the initial allocation, the region of 
Pareto-optimal solutions is defined as the region lo-
cated at the north-east of Z0. The point Z1 represents 
an optimal solution. We can see that even with a sym-
metric possibility set (i.e. both individuals have the 
same capacity to derive utility from their educational 
achievements), the ordinal welfarist solution is not 
over the 45° line, as it would be the case of an utilitar-
ian optimal allocation (point W). 
One of the problems in taking Pareto-optimality as a 
normative criterion is that it allows for multiple equilib-
ria, since more than one allocation are Pareto-optimal 
(generally, all the allocations located on the utility pos-
sibility frontier are potential Pareto-optimal points), 
and one might have no clue regarding how to choose 
between them. More broadly speaking, this criterion 
does not necessarily allow us to rank unequivocally all 
allocations. Indeed, not even allocations with different 
sums of utilities can be unambiguously ranked by the 
Pareto criterion, contrary to what happens in the wel-
farist utilitarian case. For example, suppose that allo-
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Where: O: origin; FF’: utility possibility frontier; Sn: social welfare contours S4  S3  S2  S1; Ui: utility of indi-
vidual i; Ai: educational achievement of individual i; Xi: vector of other variables influencing utility of individual i; 
Z0: initial allocation; Z1: optimal final allocation according to ordinal welfarist Pareto criterion, with a welfarist 
utilitarian SWF; W: optimal allocation according to (cardinal) welfarist utilitarianism. 
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cation A provides a level of educational achieve-
ments of 5 to individual j and of 4 to individual k, and 
that allocation B provides 12 to individual j and of 3 
to individual k. Welfarist utilitarians would prefer B to 
A, since the sum in B is 15, and it is 9 in A. But these 
distributions of outcomes would not be ranked by the 
Pareto criterion since, for individual j, B is preferred 
to A, while for individual k, A is preferred to B. 
Moreover, it is clear that the Pareto-optimal solution 
will always depend on the location of the initial allo-
cation (Z0), which could have been determined in an 
absolutely arbitrary manner. For example, if in the 
initial state all the resources had been allocated to 
only one individual, in which case point Z0 would co-
incide with point F, the optimal allocation point would 
also be the initial one. The optimal policy would then 
amount to “not doing anything”, otherwise individual j 
would be – unfairly according to the Pareto crite-
rion – harmed.9 
The bottom line is that the requirement of unanimity 
makes the Pareto solution too restrictive a criterion. It 
is inadequate as a tool for informing on most policy 
decisions, since virtually any real-world policy is po-
tentially harmful for one or for more individuals.10 
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An alternative to escape both the problems of cardi-
nal utilitarianism and those of ordinal Paretianity 
could consist of restricting the analysis to an attribute 
that would be accurately measurable and compara-
ble between different individuals. In education, this 
could be done by choosing the following maximand: 
maximizing the educational achievements of stu-
dents. The difference with respect to welfarist utilitari-
anism is that now the objective function is not a utility 
function anymore, but rather a function of educational 
achievements. The impact that the latter might have 
on utility is completely ignored, as shown in the ex-
pression below. 
 
W =  Ai  (Equation 3 : Educationist utilitarianism) 
 
where: i = 1,…n. The normative objective in terms of 
social welfare (W) is defined as the sum of educa-
tional achievements of each individual (Ai). 
 
The graphic representation of this normative position 
is equivalent to those shown in figure 2, but replacing, 
on the graph’s axes, utility (Ui), by educational 
achievements (Ai). 
Strictly speaking, focusing on an objective measure 
(education) instead of focusing on a subjective meas-
ure (utility) means a net departure from utilitarianism. 
Indeed, one important trait – and, in a sense, 
strength – of utilitarianism is that it refuses any kind of 
paternalism. Utilitarians do not expect some entity 
such as the state to take decisions regarding what is 
good and what is bad for each individual, or regarding 
how much of each good an individual is to consume 
(e.g. what education level each individual is to 
achieve). It is because they want to respect individu-
als’ preferences that they focus on a subjective meas-
ure of well-being such as utility, and not on an objec-
tive measure such as educational achievements. 
Having said that, another important feature of utilitari-
anism is their emphasis on aggregates. Utilitarians are 
typically not worried about the distribution of a relevant 
attribute, but rather on the overall sum of this attribute. 
While usually the attribute is taken to be utility, the 
possibility of choosing another one, such as educa-
tional achievements, is not excluded. Because the lat-
ter feature is respected (emphasis on aggregates), we 
classify the normative position currently at issue as 
‘utilitarian’. The adjective ‘educationist’ is there 
though, in order to qualify this classification due to the 
violation of the former feature of utilitarianism (no pa-
ternalism). 
We have seen that in a pure utilitarian framework 
(welfarist utilitarianism), weighing losses and gains 
would be an infeasible task. In an educationist utilitar-
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ian approach, instead, the endeavor is less demand-
ing: it is, indeed, possible to assess the scores of 
students in cognitive exams, to know more or less 
precisely the years of schooling or the highest 
schooling level attained, or to obtain measures of 
other educational outcomes. So the difficulties re-
lated to measurement and to interpersonal compara-
bility do not constitute obstacles in this case.  
There is also another heuristic advantage of the edu-
cationist approach. In the welfarist utilitarian case, 
designing educational policies require: (i) either as-
suming that ‘other variables’ (Xi in equation 2) are 
not important at all, in order to focus solely on the 
effect of educational achievements on utility, (ii) or 
admitting that ‘other variables’ are important, but thus 
having to deal with normative issues that go far be-
yond the educational sector. In the educationist ap-
proach, questions of macrojustice can be ignored 
and the attentions can be turned to smaller-scale 
normative issues (mesojustice), that is, to limit the 
attention to the educational sector. If we think small-
scale normative issues are easier to handle and pol-
icy design is less problematic in this case, as com-
pared to large scale normative issues, we under-
stand in what sense this is a heuristic advantage of 
the educationist approach. 
Hence in terms of normative objective of the school-
ing system, whilst a welfarist utilitarian takes it to be 
the maximization of post-schooling outcomes 
(especially aggregate wages), an educationist utilitar-
ian takes it to be maximization of schooling outcomes. 
One of the prescriptions of the educationists is prima-
facie not essentially different from one of the welfa-
rists’ prescriptions – pick the winners and invest the 
educational budget mainly on them. But in this case, 
there is no need to pass by the intermediary step of 
utility: picking the winners here means picking the 
most-talented kids in terms of cognitive ability (the 
‘good students’), and not in terms of utility production. 
The adoption of educationist utilitarianism precludes 
one from picking bad students who are good utility 
producers. 
Simultaneously, utilitarians would try to find out which 
inputs are the most effective in the process of produc-
ing education. Knowing that, they would recommend 
investing the educational budget especially in those 
inputs that would maximize the sum total of educa-
tional achievements. 
Sen criticizes welfarist utilitarianism since it “…cannot 
tell between two distributions of the same total util-
ity” (Sen, 2000: 67). Analogously, a coherent educa-
tionist utilitarian would not tell between two distribu-
tions of the same total educational achievements, 
since he is only worried about the aggregate. Thus, he 
would not care about the distribution of educational 
achievements, nor would he bother to support affirma-
tive action or positive discrimination policies, or, gen-
erally, any educational policy with a distributive com-
ponent. 
$%
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For libertarians such as Nozick (1974), a just society 
is a free society. Libertarianism is not a consequen-
tialist theory such as utilitarianism or egalitarianism 
(discussed in the previous and following sections, 
respectively), which only care about final outcomes, 
but rather a theory that places a lot of importance on 
individual’s rights and on procedures (it is sometimes 
classified as a procedural justice theory). Liberties of 
the individuals and respect to property are given 
maximal priority. State intervention should be re-
stricted to a minimum. Libertarians believe that, once 
a historical process has been put in motion, with ini-
tial conditions justly set, any intervention by the state 
or by any other third party is a violation of individual 
liberties, an attack on legal rights, or even a theft if it 
involves the compulsory confiscation of economic as-
sets (e.g. through taxation).  
Libertarians defend three principles: (i) property of 
oneself: the individual has the property of himself and 
cannot renounce to it, (ii) transfer fairness: transfers of 
holdings must be done voluntarily, (iii) fairness in the 
original acquisition of goods. If these rights have not 
been respected, that is, if the “historical process” has 
not been fair, then libertarians need to evoke a fourth 
principle: (iv) rectification of past injustice in holdings. 
Clearly it is not possible to properly identify and meas-
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ure past injustices, in order to rectify them. To solve 
this problem, some libertarians defend that all valu-
able assets should be equally distributed to all indi-
viduals before the ‘race’ restarted, respecting now 
the three main principles (Arnsperger & Van Parijs, 
2000: 39). 
One of the main strengths of libertarianism – its re-
fusal to care about consequences and its focus on 
processes – is also one of its main weaknesses. To 
Sen (2000), this normative position precludes trade-
offs and is too constraining, since it has a binary na-
ture: either a right is respected or not; either a soci-
ety is just or not. Sen criticizes the libertarians for 
their neglect of the social consequences of the con-
straints and requirements their theories impose, es-
pecially the privileged position given to rights and lib-
erties. Even conceding that liberty is important, he is 
particularly reticent towards libertarians: “It is hard to 
argue that a libertarian theory with its extremely nar-
row informational focus, and its neglect of human 
welfare and misery, can provide an adequate theory of 
justice in general, and in particular a sufficient theory 
for analyzing inequality and inequity” (Sen, 2000: 69). 
$given its main features, libertarianism useful-
ness in guiding the design of policies is quite limited. 
This normative position may not be represented by a 
maximand, since there is nothing to be maximized, but 
only restrictions to be respected. According to Wil-
liams & Cookson (2000: 1889), libertarianism can be 
interpreted as a way of “restricting the feasible oppor-
tunity set”. This set can be a utility set in a welfarist 
setting, or, in an extra-welfarist setting, a health set, 
an educational set etc.. As some rights and liberties 
have to be respected by society and enforced by the 
state, the final outcome may be one in which there is 
less educational output for each individual than in a 
hypothetical case where society would not even be 
asked to respect these constraints12 
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Where: O: origin; F0F’0: unrestricted educational achievements possibility frontier; F1F’1: restricted possibility 
frontier; Ai: educational achievement of individual i; L: possible “optimal” allocation. (As there is no maximand, 
the outcome of the market is the optimal. Any allocation along the possibility set is potentially an optimal solu-
tion.) 
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For example, suppose it was possible to know ex-
actly which individuals, among a given population, 
had the better teaching skills. If these individuals ac-
tually became teachers, the aggregate level of edu-
cational achievements of the students of this commu-
nity would be maximal. Utilitarians would not be 
against a consequentialist policy that obliged such 
individuals to become teachers, since utilitarians only 
care about the final outcome. Libertarians, in turn, 
would not accept such a policy, since they believe 
individuals must be free to choose their occupations, 
regardless of the consequences of their choices. In 
this example, without the policy, some of the indi-
viduals with potentially high teaching skills would 
choose to do something else and not become teach-
ers, and other individuals with lower teaching capac-
ity would become teachers. The final outcome would 
probably be one of less educational output for each 
individual as compared to the case in which the con-
sequentialist policy would have been implemented. 
Graphically, the education possibility set is shrunk 
towards the southwest (towards the origin) by the lib-
ertarian constraints, that is, the frontier moves from 
F0-F’0 to F1-F’1. 
 
Educationist libertarianism 
Strictly speaking, any discussion about redistribu-
tions of educational inputs and outcomes for a liber-
tarian is senseless. Affirmative action and positive 
discrimination are senseless. A pure libertarian 
would consider education as an ordinary good, and 
as such, a good whose production and distribution 
should not be provided, nor funded, nor regulated by 
the state. Parents should be free to choose what kind 
of education they want for their children. Principals 
and professors should be free to choose what kind of 
education they want to offer the pupils. The state 
would not have any particular role in the market for 
this ordinary good. It would be limited to two kinds of 
action: to prevent violence, theft, or violation of 
rights, and to enforce contracts (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 
1980). 
Under the strict libertarian framework, there remains 
some scope for “private charity for the poor and the 
disabled” (Williams & Cookson, 2000). In education, 
this would take the form of private schools that would 
have as an aim to teach poor and/or untalented pupils. 
They would exist only if market forces required or al-
lowed them to exist. This could happen if the rich felt 
sorry about the uneducated people or if, for some rea-
son, they considered that it would be in their own in-
terest to provide at least a small amount of education 
to all individuals. 
A less strict libertarianism (labeled here educationist 
libertarianism) could be taken into account for the pur-
pose of investigating issues related to education. We 
know that a libertarian would not care about differ-
ences in educational outcomes, provided that the his-
torical process that conducted to such a state of af-
fairs had been just. Suppose we consider the notion of 
“historical process” in a very restricted sense, which 
consists of treating it as synonymous with ‘educational 
process’. It could be argued that the absence of barri-
ers to education for all individuals would constitute a 
sufficient condition to satisfy a libertarian. This educa-
tionist libertarian would not care about rights in any 
other instance, except from the educational process. If 
individual A differs from individual B in terms of talent, 
for example, and if A is more capable than B in trans-
lating his advantages of talent into better educational 
performance or achievement, it is fair, from a libertar-
ian viewpoint, that A extracts all the benefits from the 
fruit of his own efforts or innate talent (for example, 
that A stays longer than B at the schooling system). 
Any state policy aiming at distributing educational re-
sources would be considered illegitimate.  
According to this latter version of libertarianism, the 
state would be allowed to intervene in the schooling 
system only to make sure that nobody is precluded 
from enrolling at school. However, this intervention 
would have to be done exclusively in the very early 
stage of the schooling process, and never in one of 
the more advanced stages, such as secondary and 
higher education. No intervention would be permitted 
after the start of the ‘schooling race’. 
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The distinguishing feature of egalitarianism, as op-
posed to other strands, is that their advocates reject 
inequality because they find it intrinsically unaccept-
able. This rejection of inequality might  lead to rec-
ommendations which are similar to the utilitarian ap-
proach when the latter takes into account the dimin-
ishing marginal utility of education and when possibil-
ity sets are symmetric13 – both would recommend the 
equalization of educational outcomes across indi-
viduals. However, utilitarians adhere to such pre-
scription because they are worried about maximizing 
the sum total of utility. Sen (2000) says their concern 
for inequality is somewhat “misplaced”, since it is 
done only “through the indirect channel of ineffi-
ciency”. Egalitarians, in turn, don’t really care about 
efficiency: they defend the equalization of education 
outcomes across individuals on moral grounds. 
Egalitarians do not constitute a homogeneous group. 
As it has been said in the introduction, each type of 
egalitarian have a particular conception on what at-
tribute is to be equalized in any socio-economic set-
ting: access, treatment, inputs, opportunities, out-
comes, and so on. Amartya Sen’s question “equality 
of what?”, formulated more than 20 years ago (Sen, 
1980), has not lost its relevance. 
Moreover, there are different levels of commitment to 
the egalitarian cause. The case of a less strict egali-
tarianism, which allows for some trade-off with effi-
ciency or liberty will be discussed later on, in section 
7. For the moment we concentrate in ‘strict outcome 
egalitarianism’, represented by Marxism14. Contem-
poraneous Marxists, especially analytical Marxists, 
have been trying to update Marx’s theory, by using 
concepts and research methods developed over the 
last decades in the social sciences, and by adapting 
that theory to contemporaneous reality. Such people 
condemn any kind of inequality in the property of 
economically invaluable assets, since these inequali-
ties reflect or give birth to some kind of exploitation. 
For a Marxist, a just society is one in which there is no 
exploitation. 15 
As we did before for utilitarians and libertarians, it is 
useful to distinguish two types of egalitarianism: welfa-
rist and educationist. Welfarist egalitarians would have 
a macrojustice view and would condemn inequalities 
in the utility levels of individuals. Due to their extreme 
aversion to inequality, welfarist egalitarians would 
want to minimize, or ideally to eliminate, the disper-
sion of utility levels across individuals and would not 
give any importance to the total, or average, amount 
of utility, in a clear contrast with utilitarians. Assuming 
a high correlation between educational outcomes and 
wages – which means that education is an invaluable 
economic asset – the reduction of the dispersion in 
educational performances would be a sine qua non 
condition in the path towards a less unequal society in 
terms of income distribution, and, therefore, of utility 
levels. Such a utility-egalitarian society would be a 
less exploitative society. 
Educationist egalitarians, in turn, would consider that 
dispersions in educational outcomes are undesirable 
per se, even if the link with dispersions in terms of in-
come is, for whatever reason, not established or ig-
nored: “for most parents children quality schooling is a 
highly valued end in its own right; a redistribution of 
opportunity for quality schooling would be egalitarian 
even if it did not effect later earnings.” (Bowles & 
Gintis, 1995:57). These people have a mesojustice 
view and would condemn inequalities in educational 
achievements, regardless of their effects on the well-
being (utility) of individuals. 
So both types of egalitarians are interested in equaliz-
ing an attribute (respectively, utility or educational 
achievements) across individuals. They only care 
about the distance between, say, the amount of the 
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attribute possessed by individual k (‘poor’) and the 
amount possessed by individual j (‘rich’). The welfa-
rist egalitarian maximand may be expressed as fol-
lows: 
W = Uk - P (Uj - Uk), and P     
(Equation 4 : Welfarist strict egalitarianism) 
 
where: i = 1,…n, and Ui = U(Ai, Xi). The normative 
objective in terms of social welfare (W) is defined as 
the difference between the utility level of the ‘poor’ 
individual (Uk) and the social loss due to the exis-
tence of a gap between the utilities of the ‘rich’ and 
the ‘poor’ (Uj - Uk), multiplied by a inequality aversion 
parameter P, that, in the case of a strict egalitarian, 
goes to infinity. 
Analogously, the educationist egalitarian maximand 
may be expressed as: 
W = Ak - P (Aj - Ak), and P     
(Equation 5 : “Educationist” strict egalitarianism) 
 
where: i = 1,…n, and Ai is the educational achieve-
ment levels of individuals j and k. 
 
Such maximands can be represented graphically, both 
in the utility-space and in the education-achievements-
space. The distinguishing feature of egalitarianism in 
both cases is that an optimal egalitarian allocation 
must necessarily lie over the 45° line. In figure 5 we 
see two graphic representations of educationist egali-
tarianism. 
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Where: O: origin; FF’: educational achievement possibility frontier; Ui: utility of individual i; Ai: educational 
achievement of individual I; Xi: vector of other variables influencing utility of individual i; En: optimal allocations 
according to educationist egalitarianism; (Wn: educationist utilitarian optimal allocations). 
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In order to minimize or eliminate the dispersion of 
educational outcomes, egalitarians would recom-
mend the implementation of compensatory policies, 
that is, policies that would allocate educational re-
sources differently across individuals. They should 
be designed in order to minimize, or eliminate, ine-
qualities observed in each stage of the educational 
process, such that society moves towards a final al-
location which is closer to the 45° line. For example, 
an egalitarian teacher in this two-student world would 
decide to allocate more teaching time to the less-
talented student than to the more-talented student 
such that the final marks both obtain are the same 
(or as close as possible). 
The problem with outcome-egalitarianism is that the 
‘price’ some individuals have to pay in order for soci-
ety to reach point E might be quite high. Suppose 
that we have two students, one of which is more tal-
ented (j) and the other of while is less talented (k). In 
graph 1 of figure 5, the difference in terms of talent is 
not very strong (the possibility set is almost symmet-
ric), such that the solution that maximizes total level 
of educational achievement (point W1) is not very far 
from the egalitarian optimal allocation. In this case, 
individual j would have to renounce (e.g. by having 
less teacher’s time) to only a small amount of educa-
tional achievement (AjW - AjE) for the egalitarian allo-
cation to be reached. However, if the situation is that 
of graph 2 in figure 5, then the ‘price’ to be paid 
would be dramatically high (much longer distance 
between points W2 and E2 as compared to the dis-
tance between W1 and E1). The more-talented stu-
dent would have no attention at all from the teacher, 
since the latter would devote most of the teaching 
time to the less-talented student. The final egalitarian 
allocation in graph 2 represents a case in which a 
great amount of talent (of individual j) would have 
been ‘wasted’, or at least not turned into educational 
achievements, in the name of equality. 
Undoubtedly a place at the university is an economic 
asset. An unequal distribution of such asset in the 
population clearly constitutes an injustice to a strict 
egalitarian. There are at least two interpretations of 
an egalitarian reaction towards affirmative actions 
policy (quotas for a minority group at the universi-
ties). Firstly, they could argue that a policy of quotas 
would not be enough to eliminate the exploitation of 
which the minority group the policy is victim (they are 
exploited by the majority group). Eliminating this kind 
of exploitation would require that we equalized the 
relative presence of all groups at the university, re-
specting, for example, the demographic pattern. If the 
population counts 50% of native people, in order for 
this group not to be exploited by non-native people, 
the affirmative action policy would have to make sure 
that 50% of the students at the university are native 
students. In practice, in many situations, for this princi-
ple to be respected, extremely ambitious (and unfeasi-
ble) policies would have to be implemented. 
Secondly, egalitarians could extend the argument and 
defend that each and every individual should have the 
right for a place at the university. Although quotas 
could be used as a good instrument for reducing racial 
or ethnic exploitation, they would not be sufficient to 
eliminate exploitation of some individuals by others. 
Concretely, even if an ambitious system of quotas 
were implemented, there would still exist rich and poor 
individuals in the population and thereby, exploitation 
of the latter by the former. A just society would thus 
not have been achieved. Society should then, either 
make sure every person gets a university degree (at a 
prohibitive cost), or implement a mechanism of mone-
tary compensation to be paid from those who study at 
the university to those who cannot have this social 
privilege.16 
Indirectly, a place at a good primary or secondary 
schools is also an economic asset, although much 
more indirect than the place at the university. To a 
certain extent, the above discussion concerning quo-
tas at the university also makes sense in the case of a 
place at a good school. The concrete actions at issue 
would then be affirmative action policies (quotas for 
minority groups at good schools) or, more realistically, 
positive discrimination policies (allocation of more re-
sources to schools that teach minority students). Real 
examples are the Zones d’Education Prioritaires in 
France and the SES-sensitive schooling funding 
mechanism in place in Belgium. In both cases, more 
resources are allocated to minority students, which 
are known to attain, on average, lower levels of edu-
cational achievement. 
The kind of egalitarianism that is being discussed here 
is mainly an outcome egalitarianism. One of the major 
problems with such a view is that it looks only at the 
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final result or outcome, and does not devote any at-
tention to the process. Of course, the educational 
achievements of two individuals at the end of a par-
ticular educational stage may be different due to dif-
ferentials in the resources they received during that 
educational stage (e.g. Sj>Sk, Nj>Nk, Ij>Ik, leading to 
Aj>Ak). If this is so, and if it is possible to identify the 
types of students who are likely to receive less of 
these resources (say, minority groups students), it 
seems legitimate to try to rebalance the situation, by 
giving them a larger fraction of school resources. 
However, it might also be the case that the educa-
tional achievement gap was due to differences in in-
puts which depend on the students themselves, such 
as talent and effort (Tj>Tk, Ej>Ek leading to Aj>Ak), 
and not on the resources they have been attributed. 
Should a student be ‘punished’, through the reduc-
tion of his school resources, because he is using his 
talents in order to attain higher educational achieve-
ments, moving society away from the 45° line? Should 
he be punished for exerting more efforts than his 
peers? Accordingly, why should a less-talented or 
‘lazy’ student be rewarded to the detriment of more 
brilliant or more hard-working ones? 
Although talent and effort are quite different in nature 
(the former is given by chance, the latter requires per-
sonal commitment), it seems difficult to condemn any 
student who makes use of both of them. And it seems 
difficult to defend a policy of differentiated attribution 
of resources, intended to reduce educational achieve-
ment gaps, if one thinks those gaps are mainly due to 
differences in these personal inputs. In outcome egali-
tarianism no role is given to the responsibility of the 
individuals, which constitutes a major vulnerability of 
this normative viewpoint. 
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The work of political philosopher John Rawls is the 
basis of the fourth “cardinal point” in contemporary 
theories of social justice according to the classifica-
tion of Arnsperger & Van Parijs (2000). Rawls’ theory 
combines normative values which are at the core of 
the first three previous sets of theories. It balances 
the social importance that is attributed to equality 
and to liberty, without neglecting efficiency issues.  
Rawls states two principles of justice, the second of 
which is composed of two parts: 
1. Principle of equal liberty. Each person is to have 
an equal right to the most extensive basic liberties 
compatible with a similar scheme of liberty for others 
(Rawls, 1971: 60). 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be ar-
ranged so that they are both  
a. To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
(difference principle), and 
b. Attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity (principle 
of fair equality of opportunities). (Rawls, 1971: 
83). 
Basic liberties are “political liberty (the right to vote 
and to be eligible for public office); freedom of 
speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and free-
dom of thought; freedom of the person along with the 
right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from 
arrest and seizure” (Rawls, 1971: 61). Note that these 
liberties include neither current property rights ar-
rangement, nor current bequest law, since none of 
them is actually “basic”. 
The difference principle admits the existence of strong 
income inequalities, provided that they benefit the 
worst-off individual (or group of individuals) when 
compared to a hypothetical income-egalitarian society. 
The principle of fair equality of opportunity says that at 
given innate talents or natural endowments, all indi-
viduals should have the same opportunities. It should 
be noted that Rawls is not concerned with actual reali-
zations, but with expected outcomes. 
These principles should be respected in a lexico-
graphic way: principle 1 has priority over principle 2b, 
which, in turn has priority over 2a. It means that basic 
liberties cannot be traded-off against, for example, 
benefits to the least advantaged individual(s): these 
benefits can only be maximized subject to respecting 
the constraint imposed by principle of equal liberty. 
The same is true for principle 2b with respect to princi-
ple 1. 
But where do these principles come from? Rawls be-
lieves that they would be obtained as a result of a 
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thought experience undertaken under very precise 
informational and behavioral assumptions. Suppose 
that individuals ignore what position they will occupy 
in a hypothetical society (“veil of ignorance”), and 
that they are asked to choose in which society they 
would prefer to live. These individuals are assumed 
to be rational and able to understand moral notions 
of right and wrong. They are also assumed to live in 
a society in which there is moderate scarcity, that is, 
a society where most basic needs are not a pressing 
problem for the individuals. They are also (implicitly) 
assumed to have an infinite risk aversion. Finally, 
they are assumed to know the distribution of relevant 
socio-economic outcomes (for example, the distribu-
tion of income or the distribution of social positions) 
over the population, but they do not know the posi-
tion they would occupy in the income distribution or 
in the distribution of social positions of this society. 
Under these assumptions, each individual is then 
asked to choose in which society he would prefer to 
live. According to Rawls, such a thought experiment 
would lead individuals to agree on those principles.  
From those two principles, Rawls infers that a just 
society is the one that assigns the highest possible 
level of “primary goods” to the worst-off group of indi-
viduals. In other words, it is a society that maximizes 
the amount of primary goods that are available to the 
individuals who are to have the minimal amount of 
those goods (whence the terminology “maximin”, 
usually associated with Rawlsian maximand). 
Primary goods are those which every rational individ-
ual would want, whatever his or her conception of 
justice, and whatever his or her life project or plan. 
They are: (a) basic liberties, (b) freedom of move-
ment and choice of occupation, (c) powers and pre-
rogatives of offices and positions of responsibility, (d) 
income and wealth, (e) self-respect. 
 
Rawls’ concerns about liberty are made explicit in the 
principle of equal liberty. His concerns about equal-
ity – however moderate the latter may look like from 
the viewpoint of an egalitarian – are made explicit in 
the difference principle. What about efficiency? A 
possible neglect with respect to efficiency issues has 
constituted one of the sources of criticism to the the-
ory of John Rawls, coming mainly from utilitarian 
thinkers. In a recent brief survey of theories of jus-
tice, Sen (2000: 71) says that “the maximin form (…) 
can be ‘extremist’ in giving complete priority to the 
worst-off’s gain (no matter how small) over the better-
off’s loss (no matter how great), and there is some in-
difference here to considerations of aggregative effi-
ciency”. However, Sen admits that Rawlsian norma-
tive maximand, either in the maximin version, or in the 
leximin17 version, can be restated so that they incorpo-
rate efficiency concerns. Indeed, it can be deduced 
from the very difference principle that Rawls do not 
believe that great amounts of precious (scarce) re-
sources of the society should be used to achieve 
egalitarian objectives. For example, Rawls would not 
approve of a policy that would have as its ambition to 
transform every less-talented individual of society into 
a graduate student at a huge cost. Society would lose, 
even – or maybe, especially – the worst-off individu-
als. 
 
Rawlsianism: economists’ version 
The theory of John Rawls has been adopted by 
economists in a simplified form, which does not take 
into account all the complexities and minutiae of the 
philosopher’s work. Concretely, the version which has 
been popularized in economics limits itself to using the 
maximand according to which society should maxi-
mize utility of the worst-off individual or group of indi-
viduals – and not an index of primary goods as recom-
mended by Rawls. The maximin criterion is very con-
veniently represented by a social welfare function ex-
pressed by a CES18 function, in which the parameter 
that represents aversion to inequality goes to infinity. 
This social welfare function in this case is equivalent 
to a Leontief-like preference representation in con-
sumer theory (complementary goods).
The maximand according to which society should 
maximize the utility of the worst-off individual (or group 
of individuals) is the most usual interpretation of the 
Rawlsian theory among economists. We can call it a 
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welfarist Rawlsian position. An alternative position 
would be an ‘educationist’ one, such as the ones we 
discussed for other theories of justice. In this case, 
the unity of measure would be education, and the 
maximand would consist of maximizing the educa-
tional achievements of the individuals whose educa-
tional achievements are the lowest in the society. 
Mathematically, these two cases could be repre-
sented as follows: 
 
W = min {Uk, Uj} (Equation 6 : welfarist Rawlsianism) 
W = min {Ak, Aj}  (Equation 7 : “Educationist”  
Rawlsianism) 
where: Ui = U(Ai, Xi). The normative objective in 
terms of social welfare (W) is assessed as the mini-
mum level among the two individuals (or groups). 
Even if one is very rich (in terms of utility or educa-
tional achievement), what matters here is the fortune 
of the poor one. 
 
As has been said previously, Rawls first principle – 
equal liberty – has priority over the other two, that is, 
basic liberties cannot be traded-off in any circum-
stances. Graphically, this is equivalent to restraining 
the production possibility set, as in the case of the lib-
ertarians. If the principle of basic liberty were not to be 
respected, we could simply apply the maximin, without 
any restrictions concerning rights. 
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Where: F0F’0: unrestricted educational achievements possibility frontier; F1F’1: restricted possibility frontier; 
Sn: social welfare contours S4  S3  S2  S1; Ai: educational achievement of individual i; R: optimal allocation, 
according to Rawlsianism; X, Y, Z: allocations, such that X~Y<Z. 
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When plotted in a graph, Leontief-like social welfare 
functions are kinked (L-form), implying that an in-
crease in the utility or well-being (or educational 
achievements) of an individual that has already at-
tained a given level of utility (or education) does not 
move the social welfare function where society is. 
Points X and Y in Figure 6 are equally desirable from 
a social viewpoint (even though AjX>AjY and 
AkX=AkY).19 However, a slight increase in the utility (or 
education) of an individual who departs from a very 
low level of utility (or education) can make a great 
difference in terms of social welfare. For example, 
point Z is socially-preferred to point Y, which is not 
surprising since both individuals (j and k) are better-
off under Z than under Y. More interestingly, point Z 
is socially-preferred to point X, due to the fact that 
the worst-off individual (k) is better-off under Z than 
under X (AkZ>AkX), even though the better-off individ-
ual (j) is in a worst position under Z than under X 
(AjZ<AjX). 
The problem with both welfarist Rawlsianism and 
educationist Rawlsianism is that they use the theo-
retical framework of welfare economics, namely the 
possibility set and some social welfare functions that 
express particular normative objective (in this case, 
the maximin). Nonetheless, this framework does not 
correspond with the one in which Rawls conceived 
this theory. He firmly rejects the possibility of inter-
preting his theory in the space of utilities, of well-
being, of education or health. The space of primary 
goods – which does not include education – is the 
right one according to Rawls. 
We ignore these important problems in this paper, 
otherwise we would have to deal extensively with 
speculations relating to the effects of educational 
outcomes on the distribution of the different primary 
goods. Rather, we stick here to this simplified version 
of Rawls’ theory (as defined by the maximin crite-
rion), since we can still draw useful insights from this 
particular normative social position, especially by 
contrasting it with other normative criteria discussed 
through the text. 
Assuming that basic liberties are not threatened, we 
have to understand how the two parts of the second 
principle would guide educational policy decisions. 
One possible interpretation is that egalitarian liberals 
would search for ways of maximizing the schooling 
attainments of the less-talented (in terms of schooling 
potential) pupils without reducing attainments of the 
more-talented ones. They could defend, for example, 
that educational resources were distributed in such a 
way that every pupil, regardless of his or her socio-
economic status, would be able to attain a minimal 
level of education. Simultaneously, they would like to 
make sure that more-talented pupils, whatever the 
source of their ‘talents’ (more effort in previous stages 
of the schooling process or more social capital at their 
disposable), be able of reaching higher steps of the 
schooling system. This position would be legitimate in 
Rawls’ view as long as the less-talented students ex-
tracted benefits, be indirectly, from the good educa-
tional performances of the more-talented students. 
Going back to the example of the affirmative action 
policies (quotas for minority students at the university), 
we could prima facie fear that a policy of quotas vio-
lated the principle of fair equality of opportunities. At 
equal talents, an individual belonging to a group that 
benefits from the quotas (minority group) would have 
a higher probability of being accepted at the university 
than an individual belonging to a group affected by the 
quotas (majority group). However, the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity refers to innate talent, while the 
admission to the university does not evaluate only in-
nate talents, but also, and mainly, the results of the 
whole process of production of education, which de-
pends on many inputs, as we saw in equation 1. 
The schooling system, broadly considered, is one of 
the institutions in which some kinds of compensation 
can be given to individuals who have not been able to 
convert potential innate talents into access to social 
positions. Accepting the assumption that different 
groups do not present statistically different distribu-
tions of innate talent, a policy of quotas or any other 
positive discrimination policy would not necessarily 
violate Rawlsian theory. In fact, these compensatory 
policies could even act in support of the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity.  
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In this section, we summarize the ideas presented at 
sections 3 to 6 by means of a simple example, as 
well as by a brief discussion about possible hybrid or 
intermediary cases. 
 
A simple example 
Table 1 shows a simple numerical example that is 
useful to summarize the ideas presented before. 
There are three possible situations: A, B and C. In 
panel I, we see that, under situation A, individuals k 
and j would acquire, each of them, 10 units of educa-
tional achievements, Ai. Under situation B, individual k 
would acquire 15 units of education, whereas individ-
ual j would acquire only 9 units. In situation C, the 
numbers would be, respectively, 13 and 11.  
,'		 -	
	 
2
	
 Panel II 
Education Situation A Situation B Situation C  Utility Situation A Situation B Situation C 
Ak 10 15 13  U (Ak, Xk) 9 13,5 11,7 
Aj 10 9 11  U (Aj, Xj) 10 9 11 
Total 20 24 24  Total 19 22,5 22,7 
Difference 0 6 2  Difference 1 4,5 0,7 
Panel I  
What situation would be preferred according to each 
type of educationist observer? An utilitarian is indif-
ferent between B or C, since both provide the same 
total amount of educational achievement, 24, but 
they are both preferred to situation A, which provides 
a lower total amount of educational achievement, 20. 
According to the Pareto criterion, the initial allocation 
can not be ignored. A move from A to C does not vio-
late the Pareto criterion, since both students would 
be better-off in the final situation (from 10 and 10 to 
13 and 11). However, any other shift would not be 
allowed by the Pareto criterion, as, for example, go-
ing from A to B, since individual j would be harmed. 
Suppose the outcome egalitarian adopted as the 
relevant measure of inequality simply the difference 
between the educational achievements of both indi-
viduals. The egalitarian would prefer situation A to 
any of the other two, since the difference is zero un-
der A, while it is 6 under B, and 2 under C. So it im-
plies that he would prefer C to B. An egalitarian lib-
eral, defined simply as a maximin advocate, would 
prefer C to A, and A to B. Under C, the worst-off indi-
vidual (j) gets 11 units of educational achievement. In 
A he gets 10 and in B he gets 9. Libertarians, in turn, 
do not care about the final result, but rather about ini-
tial conditions and the process. They can not say any-
thing based on the available information, which con-
cerns exclusively educational outcomes and not char-
acteristics of the whole education process. 
What situation would be preferred according to each 
type of welfarist observer – of course, assuming that 
utilities can be measured and compared across indi-
viduals? We suppose here that individual j is a better 
utility-producer than individual k. So, when both re-
ceive 1 unit of education, while individual j transforms 
it into 1 unit of utility, individual k transforms it only into 
0,9 unit of utility. The fact that one individual is more 
efficient than the other in producing utility out of his 
educational achievements level causes some welfa-
rists observers to adopt different ordering of situations 
A, B and C, with regards to their educationist counter-
parts’ orderings. For example, a welfarist utilitarian 
would not be indifferent between situations C and B as 
would be an educationist, but would rather prefer C to 
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B, since the total utilities are, respectively, 22,7 and 
22,5. The preferences for each normative position, 
and for both educationists and welfarists, are summa-
rized in table 2.  
2	
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Educationist* Welfarist* 
Utilitarianism B ~ C > A C > B > A 
Pareto 
  
A ---> C: ok! 
Other cases: no! 
A ---> C: ok! 
Other cases: no! 
Egalitarianism A > C > B C > A > B 
Liberal egalitarianism C > A > B C > A ~ B 
Libertarianism Fairness of process? Fairness of process? 
*: The symbol ‘>’ means ‘preferred to’, while the symbol ‘~’ means ‘indifferent to’. 
Intermediary (general) cases 
In the previous sections we restricted our analysis to 
normative positions that can be classified as extreme 
or pure ones. The reason is that our objective was to 
show the essential features and the implications of 
contrasted theories of justice. Broadly we character-
ize utilitarianism as a normative position which cares 
exclusively about efficiency; egalitarians, only with 
outcome equality; libertarians, only about freedom 
and rights. Egalitarian liberals, even in their pure 
form, already adopt a more complex and intricate line 
of reasoning, given that they combine the fundamen-
tal moral values of the other three theories.  
But it is possible to combine these theories trough an 
alternative approach, in order to represent intermedi-
ary normative positions in a more general formula-
tion. For example, it might be interesting to express a 
normative position which is essentially egalitarian, 
but that contrary to the strict outcome egalitarian 
case discussed in the text, admits some inequality to 
exist. This non-strict outcome egalitarian could be 
evoked, for example, whenever the losses in terms 
of efficiency that would be necessary to perfectly 
equalize the final educational achievements (or util-
ity) would have to be massive. Non-strict outcome 
egalitarianism is a normative position that would ad-
mit the possibility of arbitration between efficiency 
and equality (what is known in economics jargon as 
an “efficiency-equality trade-off” or even as an 
“efficiency-equity trade-off”). 
For an economist, it is natural to express intermediary 
positions through parameterized objective functions, 
such as CES20 social welfare functions or what we 
could call ‘parameterized egalitarian social welfare 
functions’, as opposed to the strict egalitarian case 
discussed in section 5. For concision, we only present 
the educationist cases here. 
 
W = [AjR + AkR] 1/R  (Equation 8 : CES social welfare 
functions) 
W = Ak – P (Aj - Ak) (Equation 9 : Parameterized egali-
tarian social welfare functions) 
 
where: Ak = represents the educational achievements 
of a weak student (or group of students), and Aj 
stands for the educational achievements of a strong 
student (or group of students); R and P are inequality 
aversion parameters. Specifically, P  represents the 
social cost of inequality (or ‘social disutility of inequal-
ity’, in economic jargon). 

These expressions allow us to understand that there 
is not an absolute opposition between the objective 
functions derived from each theory of justice. There is 
in fact a continuum of objective functions, which vary 
in accordance with the values attributed to R and P, the 
inequality aversion parameters. In the CES case, the 
*+702<7	0	2
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objective function becomes the utilitarian one when 
R=1, a generic Cobb-Douglas function when R=0 or a 
Rawlsian one, when R-. In the parameterized 
egalitarian case, the social welfare function ranges 
from the Rawlsian case, when P = 0 to the purely 
egalitarian case, when P. The intermediary 
cases, represented by finite values of P, allow for the 
existence of trade-offs between the distance be-
tween the weak and the strong students, (Aj-Ak) and 
the level obtained by the weak student (Ak). 
The last graph (figure 7) shows the optimal points 
according to each of the normative positions dis-
cussed in the previous sections, but including inter-
mediary positions, such as the one represented by 
point P (which is in segment E-R). Therefore, P is a 
position which stands between the pure Rawlsian 
case and the strict egalitarian one. But to allow for 
the existence of a difference between the Rawlsian 
position and the strict egalitarian one, it is necessary 
to relax the assumption that the possibility set is con-
vex in all its extension. Indeed, in figure 7, the educa-
tion possibility set has a different shape when com-
pared to the previous ones. The assumptions stated in 
section 2.3 do not hold anymore. Now there are seg-
ments in which an increase in the educational 
achievement of one individual can be accompanied by 
an increase in the educational achievement of the 
other (for example, when we go from point F1 to L1). 
This possibility set also allows for the educational 
achievements of both individuals to be simultaneously 
reduced (going from point R to point P). 
,0		
S
Where: O: origin; F1-F’1: (restricted) educational achievements possibility set (not monotonically decreasing 
from left to right anymore);  Ai: educational achievement of individual i; E: egalitarian optimal allocation; R: 
Rawlsian; optimal allocation; W: utilitarian optimal allocation; P: possible non-strict, or “parametrized”, egalitar-
ian optimal allocation; L0 and L1: possible libertarian optimal allocation; L0-L0’: segment of Pareto-optimal allo-
cations when the starting point is allocation L0; L1: allocation for which there is no possible Pareto-
improvement. 
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In this paper, we tried to provide a basic framework 
for thinking about normative questions related to 
education. We presented our interpretation of what 
justice in education is, according to four main sets of 
contemporary theories of social justice, utilitarianism, 
libertarianism, egalitarianism and egalitarian liberal-
ism. In the case of utilitarianism, we distinguished the 
cardinal from the ordinal version. To all four norma-
tive positions, we discussed educationist and welfa-
rist approaches, and interpreted them as being re-
lated, respectively, to a mesojustice perspective 
(only education matters to justice), and to a macro-
justice perspective (not only education matters to jus-
tice). We tried to point out the main traits and fea-
tures, strengths and vulnerabilities, of each of these 
four theories of justice, as well as of their variations.  
We believe that this text is worthwhile for many rea-
sons. First of all, at a purely abstract level, it contrib-
utes to clarifying the conception of fair (or optimal) 
schooling system each one of us has. Intuitive con-
ceptions of justice in education, based on our moral 
beliefs, can be better framed through a careful trans-
position to the education sector of some of the main 
theories of distributive justice, a task we accom-
plished here to a certain extent. That should help 
each of us think about which inequalities are unac-
ceptable or inequitable (what is more illegitimate: ine-
qualities of educational outcomes or inequalities of 
utility level?) and which are not, and what moral val-
ues are worth taking into account and what are not 
(what relative weight should one give to equality, to 
efficiency, and to freedom?). Depending on what 
definition of justice in education one adheres to, the 
educational policies he or she will support, suggest, 
or struggle against, will be different. Different 
(normative) conceptions of optimal educational allo-
cations require different (positive) policies, since 
each policy is expected to drive the schooling system 
into a different direction. This issue has been largely 
illustrated throughout the paper.  
Secondly, this text is also useful as a means of more 
accurately interpreting the normative objectives un-
derlying actual educational prescriptions, as well as 
the structure of arguments that underlie actual edu-
cational policies and policy proposals. For example, 
criticizing a particular educational policy by saying it is 
“liberal” is unsatisfactory for someone who is mini-
mally acquainted to theories of justice – since most of 
them have some “liberal” feature. But by identifying 
that such policy contains clear features of libertarian-
ism or utilitarianism, the criticisms can be more accu-
rate, targeted and probably rightful, especially if they 
take into account the potential problems of the alterna-
tive policies (say, an egalitarian policy) suggested by 
such critics. 
Thirdly, the normative analysis accomplished here 
should help providing us a better understanding of the 
actual characteristics, weaknesses and strengths of 
systems already in place. For example, although it is 
certainly not a pure market system, but rather a sys-
tem in which the government plays an important role, 
the Belgian schooling system has freedom of choice, 
for both parents and schools, as one of its corner-
stones. Is freedom too highly prized in such system or 
is it valued in the appropriate measure? Is the Belgian 
system closer to a libertarian system or to a Rawlsian 
system? 
Fourthly, the interrelation between political philosophy 
and welfare economics is not useless. The text makes 
us think about the difficulties involved in any normative 
analysis. Difficult choices have to be made; trade-offs 
are often unavoidable. Can we fully subscribe to any 
of the extreme normative views described here? 
Probably not. Fortunately, as shown in section 7, 
some of the normative positions which originate from 
political philosophy can be expressed in more general 
terms by mathematical formulations more frequently 
used in economics. These general formulations have 
the advantage of allowing the representation of inter-
mediary or hybrid normative concerns, and not only 
the extreme cases. 
It should be noted that the mathematical formulations 
have remained at a very simple level, since this text is 
just an introduction to the subject, and it has not been 
written to an economist’s audience. This means that 
there is a lot of scope for improvements in this re-
spect. For example, in a world with many individuals 
(and not only two as in the examples shown), what 
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would Rawls recommend: to maximize the educa-
tional level of the 5% of worst student or the 10% of 
worst student? More generally, to define optimal allo-
cations and to compare different distributions of Ai or 
Ui when many individuals are involved, the issue of 
the method used for aggregating Ai or Ui across indi-
viduals becomes extremely relevant. To deal with 
that, “the rather technical sub-field of the measures 
of unjust inequalities”, as stated by Kolm (2001), has 
to be investigated in a close relationship with what 
we have done here, a (brief) systematized analysis 
of justice. 
A sixth point we would like to emphasize is another 
issue which is partly lifted up due to the use of eco-
nomic reasoning here. It is a broad question, con-
cerning the contrast between welfarist and educa-
tionist approaches. Fleurbaey (1996) claims an es-
sential element of any theory of economic justice is 
its “extent or field of application”. Nevertheless, he 
admits that with respect to that, it still lacks an appro-
priate device that would allow us to determine the 
appropriate extent or field of application of a given 
theory of justice. Kolm (2002), in turn, points out that 
achieving macrojustice is the most important objec-
tive, but he also argues that pursuing mesojustice 
can be justified on two grounds: (i) aiming at attain-
ing macrojustice may be too ambitious an objective; 
so achieving justice in particular aspects, sectors or 
domains may be useful intermediary steps in the 
long path of driving a society into global justice, (ii) 
he argues that people ordinarily think in a 
‘segmented way’ and they intuitively want justice to 
be made in each domain. But if theories of social jus-
tice are concerned with general justice, is it legiti-
mate to derive from them prescriptions that are 
‘applied to’ particular socio-economic situations, such 
as education? Can we say that an objective ap-
proach (educationist, mesojustice) is intrinsically more 
appropriate or is it attractive simply because it is eas-
ier to handle or less ambitious? Should we abandon 
the subjective approach (welfarist, mesojustice), which 
has received lots of criticisms over the last decades 
inside the economics profession and from outside of it 
(see section 3) or should we keep on trying to use it 
because of its advantages (namely, that it dispenses 
with paternalism)? We do not resolve this issue here; 
we just wanted to point it out as an interesting open 
question21 
Finally, this text is certainly useful as a general intro-
duction to a (tentative and brief) application of those 
four sets of theories of distributive justice to the par-
ticular domain of education. But although the four 
theories have been presented as equally relevant, it is 
clear that the fourth set of theories – egalitarian liber-
alism – is intuitively richer than the other ones, in the 
sense that it combines different moral values in its 
core. Following the seminal work of John Rawls, a se-
ries of scholars have written their own normative oeu-
vres during the last three decades, deeply inspired by 
Rawls or overtly criticizing him: Sen, Van Parijs, 
Dworkin, Roemer, Fleurbaey. These writings can be 
classified, somewhat vaguely, as “post-Rawlsian dis-
tributive justice theories” (Maguain, 2003). Most of 
them have led to the outset of a conception of justice 
which is highly intuitive and has become very wide-
spread lately, is known under the name of “equality of 
opportunity”. So the section on egalitarian liberalism is 
an introduction to such notion.  The link between 
egalitarian liberalism and contemporaneous notions of 
equality of (educational) opportunity is left as a task 
for a future work. 
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